

Deep Disagreement and Hinge Epistemology

Chris Ranalli
VU Amsterdam

1 Introduction

Consider disagreements over whether the Earth was created by God less than 10,000 years ago (so-called young Earth creationism), or over the worldview expressed by the Berkeleyan triad of theism, immaterialism, and idealism; or over the extreme variants of the so-called New World Order conspiracy theory, in which nefarious beings have been systematically and radically deceiving us with respect to not only major historical and political events, but also our general beliefs about the world, such as that we don't live in a simulation.¹ These are ordinarily taken to be *deep disagreements* because they seem to be systematic disagreements rooted in contrary worldviews.²

One influential way of thinking about deep disagreements has its roots in Wittgenstein's (1969) *On Certainty*.³ A major theme of *On Certainty* is that rational evaluation generally presupposes a fixed set of commitments for any agent. These are the so-called general "hinge commitments" of rational evaluation: the fundamental 'presuppositions' of one's worldview which make one's rational evaluations, such as the evaluations of a belief as justified, intelligible to us (see Pritchard 2015, 70. cf. Coliva 2015, Wright 2004).

To see this idea in practice, imagine a disagreement between a skeptic about the past, who thinks that we have no evidence against the hypothesis that the Earth wasn't created only minutes ago, and an ordinary geologist, who seems to issue claims inconsistent with the skeptic's view, routinely making epistemic claims about the distant past, like 'we know that those boulders are millions of years old'. We can easily imagine the geologist marshalling evidence from the fossil record and various abductive considerations against the skeptic's claim. As Coliva (2015) observes, however: "geological beliefs about the specific age of the Earth could only be justified by taking for granted that the Earth had existed for a very long time. Only that way could fossils and other evidence be brought to bear on the issue of the specific age of the Earth" (Coliva 2015: 1). *Mutatis mutandis* for the disagreement between the ordinary geologist and the young Earth creationist. They'll disagree over the age of the Earth, and they'll seem to marshal reasons for their contrary views as well. The application of the Wittgensteinian idea here is that the reasons they offer for their positions presuppose more basic commitments about the existence of the Earth. In the geologist's case, that it's a naturally occurring phenomenon, stretching into the distant past. In the young Earth

¹ See Barkun (2003).

² See Hazlett (2014), pg. 13.

³ See Hazlett (2014), Feldman (2005), Fogelin (2005), Lynch (2016), and Pritchard (2011b).

creationist's case, that it's *not* only a naturally occurring phenomenon, and that it doesn't stretch into the distant past. Instead, it's cosmologically very young.

What I will call the **Wittgensteinian account of deep disagreement** says that deep disagreements are disagreements over the *hinge commitments* of one's worldview.^{4,5} In this paper, I want to explore whether the Wittgensteinian account of deep disagreement supports pessimism about such disagreements: that they cannot be rationally resolved. I will argue that the Wittgensteinian account provides adequate support for pessimism about deep disagreement on so-called *non-epistemic* accounts of hinge commitments. On this view, hinge commitments aren't subject to rational evaluation and otherwise lack epistemic properties (Pritchard 2011a, 2015). I argue that while non-epistemicism supports deep disagreement pessimism, the theory has several implausible consequences, and thus casts doubt on whether we should understand hinge commitments non-epistemically. I will then consider so-called *epistemic* theories of hinge commitments, according to which hinge commitments are subject to rational evaluations of a certain sort, and can possess certain epistemic properties. I will argue that on one development of non-epistemicism—the so-called inferential contextualist view (Williams 1991, 2007)—disagreement over hinge commitments as such are impossible, and so even an epistemic view leads to pessimism. However, I also consider another epistemic view, the entitlement theory of hinge commitments (Wright 2004, 2014), and argue that it allows for rational resolution to disagreements over hinge commitments.

Let me clarify what I mean by 'rational resolution' in this context. I will understand the possibility of an *epistemically rational resolution* to a disagreement as the possibility of the disagreeing parties taking the pair of attitudes (belief, disbelief, suspension) that they *epistemically ought* to take, in light of their disagreement, such that those attitudes are sufficient for epistemically rational agreement (cf. Feldman 2005, Lynch 2016). For example, suppose two people disagree over whether they should take their coat outside. The proponent of the coat-taking says that P is their reason for believing that they should take their coat. The denier of coat-taking says that Q is their reason for denying that they should. A rational resolution to their disagreement here would be reaching agreement—whether by both mutually believing, disbelieving, or suspending belief—by way of their appreciation of the *epistemic reasons* for taking those attitudes in that case, not only the *practical reasons* they might have to reach agreement. I will thus be presuming that epistemic rationality and prudential rationality can come apart. What I will be calling the *pessimist* about deep disagreement is someone who maintains that such disagreements are rationally irresolvable in this sense, while the *optimist* denies this. So, the pessimist here denies only that deep disagreements can be epistemically rationally resolved, not practically rational resolved.

Now, you might intuitively think that resolution to a disagreement implies reaching agreement. So, the possibility of rationally resolving a disagreement in this sense entails the

⁴ A note about the terminology here. Some authors use 'framework proposition' to refer to the same thing, such as Fogelin (2005). Wright (2004), on the other hand, uses 'cornerstone proposition'. I'll follow Pritchard (2015) and use 'hinge commitment' instead of 'hinge proposition' where necessary, because it's a matter of philosophical controversy whether the hinges are propositions. Moreover, while I'm considering many specific theories of hinge commitments in this paper, I'm not considering *all* of them, but rather a cluster of representative cases.

⁵ This view has been recently considered by Fogelin (2005), Feldman (2005), Hazlett (2014), Lynch (2016), and Pritchard (2011b). See also Adams (2005), Campolo (2009), Dare (2013), Friemann (2005), Phillips (2008), and Turner and Wright (2005).

possibility of reaching agreement by epistemically rational means, say, by way of following what your epistemic reasons tell you that you ought to do, in light of your disagreement. According to Feldman (2005), this can be achieved in three ways:

[...] both can end up believing P , both can end up believing $\neg P$, or both can end up suspending judgment on the topic. [...] It may be that when the people suspend judgment they have not *resolved the issue*. That is, they have not come to an agreed upon conclusion about it. It is left open. But they have overcome their disagreement. Proposition P is no longer something about which they have different beliefs. They have *resolved their disagreement* (Feldman 2005: 16-17).

The pessimist about deep disagreement as we will understand them denies the rational resolvability of deep disagreement in this sense. However, as we will see, the non-epistemic theorists way of developing the Wittgensteinian account of deep disagreement seems to imply an even stronger pessimistic view: that you can even *rationally respond* to a disagreement over a hinge commitment (more on this in §2-3). According to this view, necessarily there is *no* attitude (whether belief, disbelief, or suspension) that you epistemically ought to take to the content of what you disagree over. This sense of irresolvability, of course, demurs from the ordinary sense of irresolvability, which only seems to entail the impossibility of reaching agreement.

Now, by ‘epistemic reason’ I have something very inclusive in mind: as anything—be it the evidence, your experiences, testimony, seemings, beliefs, or arguments—which informs what you epistemically ought to think (cf. Pryor 2014). Epistemic reasons so understood don’t need to have an objective or ‘external’ relation to truth, such as by entailing that your belief is true, or by being reliable, but only a subjective or ‘internal’ relation to truth, such as that from the subject’s perspective, the reason they have for p makes it likely that p (see Bonjour 1985, 8). It doesn’t *actually* have to make it likely that p . So, I’m not claiming that epistemic reasons are *not* externally related to truth. Rather, I’m claiming what we are interested in for the purposes of this paper are whether reasons *in this sense* can be exchanged so as to rationally resolve such disagreements (cf. Pritchard 2011b, 270). Compare with Lynch (2016) on the relevant sense of rational persuasion: “you rationally persuade someone of some proposition when you move her to change her commitment-state on the basis of a reason that would make sense internal to her perspective” (Lynch 2016, 252). The thought here is that you rationally resolve your disagreement with somebody if you offer them your reason for adopting your attitude to the proposition, and they appreciate that this reason counts towards taking the attitude that you do and subsequently change their mind to match your attitude, in light of this fact.

Here’s the structure of the paper. In section 2, I explain what the Wittgensteinian account of deep disagreements is and why it provides a *prima facie* case for pessimism about deep disagreement. In the remaining parts of the paper, I explore how the different ways of developing the theory of hinge commitments can have a serious impact on whether the Wittgensteinian theory adequately supports pessimism. To this end, in section 3, I argue that the *non-factualist theory* of hinge commitments provides adequate support for pessimism about deep disagreement. In section 4, I argue that the *non-belief theory* of hinge commitments provides adequate support for pessimism about deep disagreement. In sections 5-6, I consider the epistemic theories of hinge commitments. First, I argue that the *inferential contextualist theory* of hinge commitments provides adequate support for pessimism about deep disagreement. Finally, in section 6, I argue that the *entitlement theory* of hinge

commitments doesn't adequately support pessimism about deep disagreement, thereby opening a window of optimism for hinge epistemology. Finally, section 7 considers some objections and replies.

2. Hinge commitments and Pessimism

We can summarize the basic case for pessimism about deep disagreement on the basis of the Wittgensteinian theory as follows:

(P1) Deep disagreements are disagreements over hinge commitments.

(P2) Disagreements over hinge commitments are rationally irresolvable.

Therefore,

(C) Deep disagreements are rationally irresolvable.

Call this the **Wittgensteinian Argument** for pessimism. The first premise is simply an expression of the Wittgensteinian theory of deep disagreement. However, we need to draw a distinction here between *direct* and *indirect* deep disagreements. We should understand (P1) as saying that direct deep disagreements are disagreements explicitly over hinge commitments. For example, if you and I disagree over whether there is an external world and other related claims, we are engaged in a direct deep disagreement, on this picture at least. Indirect deep disagreements, by contrast, are in the first instance disagreements which in some way *commit* the disagreeing parties to directly disagreeing over a hinge commitment. Such a case arises when, for instance, your *reasons* for holding your view commits you to directly disagreeing with someone over a hinge commitment, as when your reason for believing that, say, there is an external physical world is that you have hands, among many other propositions. In this case, one proposition—that you have hands—is offered as rational support for another—that there is an external physical world. Since my main question is with whether the Wittgensteinian theory adequately supports deep disagreement pessimism, I will bracket whether (P1) is true. It suffices that the theory is taken seriously by contemporary epistemologists as a theoretical starting point for our thinking about deep disagreement (Fogelin 2005, Feldman 2005, Hazlett 2014, Lynch 2016).^{6,7}

⁶ You might worry that some cases of deep disagreement do not look like cases of disagreement over or involving hinge commitment. It suffices that *some* deep disagreements are understood as disagreements over hinge commitments. For example, if you think—following Lynch (2010) and Kappel (2012)—that deep disagreements are disagreements over fundamental epistemic principles, that is strictly consistent with some such principles being hinge commitments. Indeed, this is plausible in the case of *induction is reliable*, among others. The Wittgensteinian view says that deep disagreements are always disagreements over hinge commitments, even if not every disagreement over a hinge commitment is a deep disagreement. Finally, the Wittgensteinian account can be seen as more general than the fundamental epistemic principle account of deep disagreement, since (i) it seems like disagreements over fundamental conditional and categorical metaphysical principles can amount to deep disagreements, but crucially (ii) it's not clear how the fundamental epistemic principle account could explain why such cases are deep disagreements. The extent to which the Wittgensteinian view and the fundamental epistemic principle views are different is explored in [redacted for blind review].

⁷ Although I am not arguing for (P1) in this paper, I think it can be motivated by way of thinking about cases of deep disagreement. For example, when we consider cases like the conspiracy theory disagreement, it's not only a disagreement over contrary fundamental epistemic principles, but crucially over many interrelated metaphysical, epistemic, and normative commitments. The Wittgensteinian view is arguably well-placed to explain this. However, since I will be arguing that on many non-epistemic and epistemic

The second premise says that disagreements over hinge commitments are rationally irresolvable. I want to pause here to consider two glaring concerns. The first is what, exactly, hinge commitments are. The second is whether the premise is even *prima facie* plausible. As we'll see, these two concerns are intimately connected. On the first point, hinge commitments are philosophically controversial in the following respect: philosophers don't agree on *what* it is to be a hinge commitment, even though they tend to agree on *which* commitments are hinge commitments. So, for example, here's a fairly representative list from Brueckner (2007):

“There is an external world, sense perception is reliable, I am not a brain in a vat, my faculty of reasoning is reliable, the Earth is more than three minutes old, testimony is reliable, memory is reliable” (Brueckner 2007: 285).

The list isn't exhaustive. There is supposed to be some reliable criteria for identifying which commitments of ours are hinge commitments. And this will turn on one's theory of hinge commitments. As we will see, there are many (jointly inconsistent) theories of hinge commitments.⁸ What they have in common, however, is that the hinge commitments are in some way *not subject* to the same sorts of epistemic evaluations that, say, beliefs about the weather are. Roughly, your hinge commitments are your most basic 'fixed points' in your worldview. They are supposed to be what makes *reason-giving* possible—that is, they are supposed to make it possible for, say, your visual experience of the downpour outside to count *as a reason to believe* that it's currently raining, and for someone who might retort “well, that's actually your neighbor watering the flowers with a large water bucket” *to doubt* whether your initial belief is true (more on this in §§3-5).⁹ Your hinge commitments are what enable that person's doubt to be intelligible *as a reasonable doubt* and for your initial belief to be intelligible *as a reasonable belief*. How they do this, of course, is a matter of philosophical controversy.¹⁰

This reason-giving property of hinge commitments makes it hard to see how they could also be *within* the *space of reasons*. After all, the thought is that by enabling the reasoning-giving relation, they lie outside the space of reasons: for the question of what reasons you have to accept or deny hinge commitments is a category mistake, as they are what make reason giving possible. However, there is a tension here with the intuitively plausible claim that many historical and contemporary philosophers have rationally *argued for* what look like hinge commitments that they believed. The external world realist, like Moore, argued that there is an external physical world. Likewise, certain sorts of idealists, like Berkeley, denied this. In short, they disagreed with each other.¹¹ The same can be said of proponents of other minds and the uniformity of nature, among others. If we take this at face-value, then it looks like epistemic reasons *can* be given for these sorts of views, and thus

theories of hinge commitments, there are several implausible consequences in the context of disagreement, this might be evidence against think that deep disagreements should be understood as disagreements over hinge commitments in the first place.

⁸ For an excellent overview, see Pritchard (2011a).

⁹ See Coliva (2015), Pritchard (2015), and Wright (2004) for this way of thinking about hinge commitments.

¹⁰ As a quick case study: Wright (2014) thinks that your hinge commitments perform this role by virtue of you being epistemically entitled to trust them. So, your visual experience is a reason to believe that it's raining only if you're epistemically *entitled to trust* that sensory experience is reliable, and that there is an uniform external world. Coliva (2015), by contrast, thinks that you only need to *assume* that sensory experience is reliable, and that there is an uniform external world.

it's an open question whether we can rationally resolve disagreements over them. What, then, might adequately support (P2)?

Consider *non-epistemicism* about hinge commitments, the thesis that “rational support for our hinge commitments are impossible” (Pritchard 2015: 71, cf. Pritchard 2011: 531). On this theory of hinges, they aren't in the space of epistemic reasons: that is, they aren't in the market for being *evidentially* believed (you lack evidence in favor of their truth or falsity), epistemically *rationaly* believed (you lack epistemic reasons to believe or deny them), or propositionally *known* (you cannot know them). If non-epistemicism is true, I think it would provide a very powerful case for (P2) of the Wittgensteinian argument. We can express the sub-argument for (P2), then, as follows:

Non-epistemicism: For any hinge commitment *H*, necessarily, it's not the case that there is any epistemically rational attitude that one rationally ought to take to *H*. That is, you are neither justified nor unjustified in take any doxastic attitude towards *H*.

Rational Resolution: For any disagreement *D* over *x*, necessarily, an epistemically rational resolution to *D* over *x* is the pair of attitudes the participants of *D* rationally ought to take to *x* such that these attitudes are sufficient for rational agreement.

Therefore, substituting a hinge commitment for *x*:

Pessimism: For any disagreement *D* over a hinge commitment *H*, necessarily, it's not the case that there is an epistemically rational resolution to *D*.

Call this the **argument from non-epistemicism**. The argument is certainly valid. First, non-epistemicism says that there is simply no possible epistemically rational attitude you ought to take to a hinge commitment *H*. This entails: if you and I somehow disagree over a hinge commitment—say you believe it's true while I believe it's false—then non-epistemicism implies that *neither* of us are epistemically rational here. Secondly, the rational resolution premise says that any epistemically rational resolution for any disagreement consists in the disagreeing parties taking the attitudes they epistemically ought to take to the relevant contents, in light of their disagreement, such that they reach agreement. So, suppose you and I disagree over whether *H* is true. If non-epistemicism is true, then since the object of our disagreement is a hinge commitment, it follows that there is *no* epistemically rational attitude that we could take to that content. Whether you believe, and I disbelieve, or you believe, and I suspend, among the other possible combinations of attitudes we might take, it follows that *none* of them would be *epistemically* rational.¹² So, not only have we not reached any rational agreement, but we haven't even managed to rationally respond to the disagreement (cf. §1).

The next question we should ask, then, is whether the premises of the non-epistemicism argument are true, or adequately supported. The rational resolution premise is, I think, highly plausible. For what else would an epistemically rational resolution to a disagreement *be* if not the disputants taking the epistemically rational attitudes that they

¹² More precisely, non-epistemicism is the thesis that: for any rational agent *A*, and hinge commitment *H*, it's not the case there is an *epistemically* rational (as opposed to practically rational) attitude that you *epistemically* ought (as opposed to practically or morally ought) to take to *H*. Following Friedman (2013), if we think of suspending judgment as a cognitive attitude subject to epistemic norms, then the conclusion of the non-epistemicism argument would rule out suspension of judgment as well. However, if we think that suspension of judgment is not a cognitive attitude, then it doesn't rule this out.

epistemically ought to take towards the content for which they disagree, such that they reach agreement? One might think that a rational resolution for a disagreement is a resolution reached by paradigmatic rational means, such as by way of our appreciation of the reason-based arguments for or against a view. By ‘reason-based argument’, what I have in mind are arguments in the informal logician and philosopher’s sense: where reasons¹³ are *explicitly offered* for a conclusion (Copi and Cohen 2005).

While I suspect this accurately reflects what we ordinary mean by ‘rationally resolving’ a disagreement, I think it is too narrow of a conception of what it is to rationally resolve a disagreement. For it is a *dialogical conception of rational resolution*, where for any disagreement D over x , participants rationally resolve D over x only if they have a matching pair of attitudes to x that they ought take in virtue of their appreciation of the arguments which bear on whether x . Paradigmatically, this is case where you and another person mutually exchange reasons: you believe p , and you offer a set of reasons R_1 for believing p , whereas your opponent believes $\neg p$, and offers a set of reasons R_2 for believing $\neg p$. Now I think that the dialogical conception of rational resolution relies on two controversial ideas: the tendency to think that rationally resolving a disagreement requires forming the right attitude to x in light of one’s *arguments* for or against x , and the tendency to think that one needs to *display* what one’s arguments are for or against x *before* we would count you as rationally responding to the disagreement. But this jettisons the very plausible idea that not everything we rationally believe is based on arguments (cf. Pryor 2014), and that there are epistemic norms which require us to take certain attitudes, given certain conditions, even if those conditions never mention arguments. For example, in Christensen’s (2007) *restaurant case*, where two people disagree over the cost of dinner, even if neither of them offered any *argument* for believing what they do, there is intuitively *some* truth about what attitude they epistemically ought to take in light of their disagreement. And surely they could, in light of their reasons, reach agreement, even if they didn’t display them to each other.

What about the non-epistemicism premise: why should we accept that premise? Wittgenstein himself seemed to think that non-epistemicism is true. In *On Certainty*, Wittgenstein said of the hinges that:

“I want to conceive it [*the hinges*] as something that lies beyond being justified or unjustified.” (OC 359).

Why did Wittgenstein think this? The basic idea is that rational evaluation is essentially local: that intelligible doubt requires that some things are not doubted, and that intelligible belief requires that some things are not believed. Certain things are held fixed as unbelieved and undoubted so as to enable some things to be intelligibly believed or doubted (Pritchard 2015). These are your hinge commitments. This is in contrast to Barry Stroud’s idea that the scope of your rational evaluation can be *fully general*, extending to anything you could believe (Stroud 2000).

¹³ I am using ‘reasons’ as *normative epistemic reasons*, and treating it *inclusively*: to include both good and bad normative reasons (or what Sylvan 2016 calls “operative epistemic reasons”). For example, that it’s currently raining outside is typically good reason to believe that it’s wet outside, whereas that I looked into my crystal-ball in which it appeared to me that it’s currently raining outside is typically not a good reason to believe that it’s raining outside—although I’m still treating it *as* a normative reason. Contrast this with slipping out of the shower, and getting a concussion which causes me to believe that it’s wet outside. This is not only not a good reason to believe that it’s wet outside, but it’s not a normative reason at all (cf. Kornblith 2015). This is a causal, or explanatory reason (Raz 2011). We can initially identify reasons by way of what you (would) offer *in support* of something you believe or plan to do (or would believe or do).

Intuitively, you might think that there is a tension between the role our hinges play in our worldviews and rationally resolving disagreement over them. For the hinges are precisely the sorts of things which make it possible for certain states of affairs, propositions, or beliefs to be evidence or reasons for other attitudes. In short, they make the space of epistemic reasons possible. And if that is right, it's hard to see how they could *also* enter into the space of epistemic reasons as objects of rational evaluation. The non-epistemicist, however, goes beyond this *prima facie* case and provides a principled reason for *why* the hinges are outside the space of epistemic reasons. To see this, we need to consider two different ways of developing non-epistemicism.

3. Non-factualism

The first way is *non-factualism*, the thesis that hinge commitments aren't truth-apt, and thus not really propositions at all (Moyal-Sharrock 2016, 2004). Rather, the hinges are *non-factual rules* (Wright 1985). If non-factualism is true, I think it would adequately support the non-epistemicism premise, and thus the non-epistemic argument would be sound.

The argument is straightforward. First, the object of belief, disbelief, and suspension are propositions: that is, truth-apt contents. Secondly, non-factual rules are, by their nature, not truth-apt. Therefore, non-factual rules are not objects of belief or disbelief. *Ipsa facto*, then, they are not objects of *justified* belief or disbelief.¹⁴

A second argument appeals more generally to epistemic norms. First, it's plausible that only *cognitive* attitudes, attitudes capable of being true or false, are subject to epistemic norms. Secondly, no attitude we take to a non-factual rule could be a cognitive attitude simply because the object of the attitude is neither true nor false. Hence, it follows that non-factual rules are not subject to any epistemic norms. Thus, if non-factualism were true of hinges, then it looks like non-epistemicism would be true of them as well. Pessimism would be right around the corner.

Wittgenstein seemed to argue for non-factualism. He said that:

OC 494 "I cannot doubt this proposition without giving up all judgement." But what sort of proposition is that?...It is certainly no empirical proposition. It does not belong to psychology. It has rather the character of a rule."

OC 204 "Giving grounds ... comes to an end;—but the end is not certain propositions' striking us immediately as true, i.e. it is not a kind of *seeing* on our part; it is our *acting*, which lies at the bottom of the language-game."

In the first passage, he says that the hinge 'proposition' has the "character of a rule". Likewise, in the second passage, he describes the epistemic practice of giving grounds for what you believe or doubt. His suggestion is that this practice 'comes to end': intuitively, you wouldn't be able to keep offering new grounds for your belief or doubt without circularity or entering a

¹⁴ Here's a worry: if x is not truth-apt, you might think we can still suspend judgment about x if suspension of judgment simply is neither believing nor disbelieving. And you might think this is precisely *the right thing to do*, that you shouldn't believe what you cannot believe. But this relies on the principle that if \neg (you epistemically should believe that x), then \neg (you can believe that x). Contraposed, we get: if you can believe x , you should believe x , which is clearly false. The point here is that even if both parties can suspend judgment over a hinge commitment in this minimal sense, it wouldn't follow that they have *rationally* reached agreement. Plausibly, you should suspend judgment on whether x only if x can be settled, but in the case of hinge commitments—understood as non-factual rules—whether they are so or not cannot be settled.

regress. But Wittgenstein doesn't thereby go the foundationalist route here and argue that there are some propositions which are immediately justified for you and which are the justificatory source of anything else you justifiably believe or doubt. Rather, there are some *actions* you perform which manifests a sense of optimal certainty in your action, and the suggestion seems to be that this action is non-cognitive, and thus not amenable to truth or falsity.

In his *Facts and Certainty*, Crispin Wright develops non-factualism as follows: if a (putative) proposition is not amenable to evidence or justification, that is reason to think that it's not factual after all (see Wright 1985: 457). So, for example, if we can't find a way to justify '2+2=4', on Wright's view that would be a sufficient reason to think that it's not truth-apt. He argues for the following factuality equivalence principle:

Factuality Equivalence: $F(\Phi)$ if and only if \Diamond [justifiably believe(Φ)]

That is, a content is true (or false) if and only if it is logically possible to justifiably believe that it is true (or false). It should be clear that the right-to-left conditional is plausible:

\Diamond [justifiably believe(Φ)] \rightarrow $F(\Phi)$. After all, if you can justifiably believe Φ , then Φ is truth-apt. How else could it be an object of belief—much less *justified* belief—if it weren't truth-apt? The left-to-right conditional, however, is less plausible: $F(\Phi) \rightarrow \Diamond$ [justifiably believe(Φ)]. While the principle plausibly retains the idea that some propositions might be false and yet justifiably believed—that is, it plausibly dispenses with infallibilism about justification—it also abandons the idea that some propositions might be true, and yet never justifiably believed—that is, it implausibly dispenses with unknowable truths or unjustifiable truths.

Another, more recent development of non-factualism, due to Moyal-Sharrock (2016), takes it that the hinges are *non-factual rules* and that our attitude to them are “animal certainties”:

The nonpropositional nature of basic certainties is one with their being ways of “acting” and to their being “animal.” Whether a hinge certainty starts out as instinctive or natural (e.g., our certainty of having a body) or is second-nature, i.e., the result of conditioning (e.g., our certainty that “This 🍷 is (what we call) a table”), it is best described as a reflex action. [...] The hinge certainty verbalised as “I have a body” is a disposition of a living creature which manifests itself in her *acting in the certainty of having a body* (Moyal-Sharrock 2016: 105).

My main worry with the non-factualist theory of hinges in this context is that the proponents of the Wittgensteinian Argument shoot themselves in the foot. For they want to show that their theory of deep disagreement leads to pessimism: the thesis that deep disagreements are rationally irresolvable. But if non-factualism is true, it's not so clear that you could *disagree* over the hinges—for they aren't truth-apt. The token phenomenon would be rationally irresolvable at the cost of being impossible.

Now the non-factualist might reply as follows: “there can be disagreements in *non-propositional attitude*, and so we can easily preserve disagreement over hinges and thus deep disagreement”.¹⁵ For example, consider the “New World Order” (NWO) or “Illuminati” conspiracy theory, according to which there is a nefarious, powerful global network of politicians, scientists, bankers, and industry-leaders who are responsible for the major geopolitical and many major natural and historical events. Proponents of this theory claim that

¹⁵ See Ridge (2012) for discussion of disagreement in non-cognitive attitude. See also Stevenson (1963) and (1944).

there is an NWO; that we are thereby radically and systematically mistaken with respect to nearly all of our political, biological, and historical views. On the most radical variants, the claim is that we are in a matrix-like simulation, controlled by evil interdimensional beings, and that politicians are merely their puppets. Plausibly, that there is no such NWO entity is a hinge commitment: for we aren't radically and systematically deceived about our social-, historical- and biological condition. Where 'pro!' and 'con!' lexically represent their non-cognitive pro-/con- attitudes, we can characterize their seeming dispute along the following lines:

CONSPIRACY THEORY DISAGREEMENT:

Alex: Pro! NWO.

Carrie: Con! NWO.¹⁶

There are two points I want to make in connection with this way of understanding the NWO Conspiracy disagreement case. First, Alex seems in some way to accept that the NWO conspiracy theory is true, while Carrie seems in some way to deny that it is true. The non-factualist, then, has to give a revisionary account of this: they have to say that Alex doesn't really accept that the NWO conspiracy theory is true, and that Carrie doesn't really deny that it's true. Rather, neither of them are making any mistake here, and thus their disagreement is, at best, *faultless*: for neither of them are making any alethic mistake (cf. MacFarlane 2014). Call this the *revisionary problem*.

Secondly, the non-cognitive pro-/con- attitudes to the non-factual contents don't seem to accurately capture Alex's or Carrie's attitudes to the NWO conspiracy theory. What is it to be pro- the NWO conspiracy theory? One might think it is to *approve* what the theory says, but this wouldn't accurately capture Alex's attitude here. For he doesn't necessarily approve of the existence of the NWO conspiratorial organization and the actions ascribed to them: he might sincerely disapprove of it. Perhaps Alex approves of the explanatory power of the NWO conspiracy theory, while Carrie denies this. But intuitively this doesn't accurately reproduce their attitudes either. You can approve of the explanatory power of a theory whilst sincerely denying the theory. For example, many philosophers are prepared to say that Berkeley's triad of theism, idealism, and immaterialism has a lot of explanatory power but nevertheless deny it because, despite its potential explanatory power, it's false and less explanatory potent than other theories. In general, the problem here is that it's hard to recover the relevant epistemic, logical, and psychological properties of *belief* in the theory using some other *non-cognitive* pro-/con-attitude. Call this the *obscurity problem*.

How might the non-factualist respond to the revisionary problem? There are two responses on offer. First, they might accept that the disputants really would need to radically revise their conception of their psychological relation to the NWO conspiracy theory and their disagreement with each other. For Alex doesn't really believe the NWO conspiracy, and Carrie doesn't really disbelieve it either. Moreover, as much as they might think they are arguing for the truth of their positions, they couldn't really be arguing for such positions any more than you can argue for the truth of 'shut the door' or 'hooray!'. The non-factualist could simply bite the bullet here.

However, non-factualists might also reject that it's revisionary: for they could say that the non-factuality of what they in some sense 'accept' makes sense of why their disagreement

¹⁶ For representing contrary non-cognitive attitudes as pro-/con-attitudes, see Chrisman (2012).

is persistent. While this might be explanatorily powerful on one level of analysis, it's a total failure at the level of their personal psychology. For intuitively Carrie *believes* that she has good reason to reject the NWO conspiracy theory, and Alex *believes* that he has good reason to accept the NWO conspiracy theory. But if non-factualism is true, *both* of them are necessarily mistaken here: neither of those higher-order beliefs could be true.

How might the non-factualist respond to the obscurity problem? Naturally, they might explore other kinds of non-propositional attitudes which do a better job of recovering the mechanics of a doxastic disagreement than if they thought of cases like CONSPIRACY DISAGREEMENT as a conflict at the level of one's *pro*-attitude on the one and the other person's *con*-attitude, on the other hand.

One proposal, from Moyal-Sharrock (2016), is to think of one's attitudes to the hinges, understood as non-factual rules, as "animal certainties". She says that:

Wittgenstein is describing *what it is like* to be basically certain; to have an attitude of basic certainty—and the answer is that it is like a way of acting or know-how or reflex action (like grabbing a towel from the towel rack without thinking). Here, "I have a body" is the expression of a nonpropositional attitude; a way of acting *in the certainty of* having a body, acting embodied (Moyal-Sharrock 2016: 104).

So, perhaps we can model the NWO conspiracy case as follows:

CONSPIRACY THEORY DISAGREEMENT 2

Alex: Animal certain of NWO Conspiracy theory.

Carrie: Animal certain of ¬NWO Conspiracy theory.

One immediate problem to note with NWO CONSPIRACY DISAGREEMENT 2 is that we cannot apply negation to the NWO conspiracy theory: the sentence 'you are radically and fundamentally deceived by virtue of the evil NWO organization' doesn't express a proposition to be negated, on the non-factualist picture. So, we would have to recast their alleged disagreement as follows:

CONSPIRACY THEORY DISAGREEMENT 2*

Alex: Animal certain of NWO Conspiracy Theory.

Carrie: It is not the case that Carrie is Animal certain of NWO Conspiracy Theory.¹⁷

Now we should wonder whether CONSPIRACY THEORY DISAGREEMENT 2* is a genuine disagreement. I think it is fairly clear that it isn't: for it's plausible that having some animal certainties, and someone lacking them or having some other animal certainties—that is, having different unreflective *ways of acting*—need not be a *disagreement*, but just a *difference*. Consider, for example, the difference between you reaching for the falling glass, while your friend notices the glass but simply doesn't reach for it. Is that a disagreement? Certainly not. Rather, it's a difference in how you both reacted. That is, you had different *non-cognitive reactions*. Why think of the CONSPIRACY THEORY DISAGREEMENT 2* case any differently?¹⁸

¹⁷ Relatedly, we could instead conceive of Carrie as having a contrary animal certainty, such as the animal certainty for the NON-CONSPIRACY HYPOTHESIS: that you aren't subject to a widespread, systematic conspiracy. Either way, the main point is unaffected.

¹⁸ cf. Ridge (2014), §1.4 on 'disagreement in attitude'.

A second problem here is that it's hard to see how 'disagreement in animal certainties' would generalize to paradigm cases of disagreement over hinge commitments. Consider the disagreement between the external world realist and the idealist. It's not clear *how* the realist or the idealist would differ with respect to their *animal certainties* here. What would it be for the idealist to no longer express animal certainties with respect to the existence of the external physical world? Surely they act the same as the idealist, *modulo* their philosophical belief-reports, certain assertions in philosophical contexts, and technical philosophical inferences. But surely *that* difference is not what the non-factualist has in mind here. What the non-factualist has in mind is the security with which you ordinarily act in the world anyway, as when you instinctively avoid danger, or go to scratch an itch on your body: in the first case, you act with the certainty of there being other things; in the second case, you act with the certainty of you having a body. Yet the Berkeleyan idealist and Moorean realist, who seem to disagree over the nexus of propositions such as that theism is true, idealism is true, and immaterialism is true, have a disagreement which intuitively goes beyond what is encoded in their animal certainties. If the non-factualist understands their respective commitments on this score as some difference in animal certainty, then it looks like non-factualism has the unintuitive consequence that the Berkeleyan idealist and the Moorean realist don't disagree after all, if we accept that sharing animal certainties is sufficient for agreement, just as not sharing them or having contrary animal certainties would be, on this view, sufficient for disagreement.

Finally, even if we understood animal certainties as simply ability knowledge, or knowing-how, intuitively it still wouldn't be a disagreement either. That Alex has some sort of distinctive know-how in connection with the NWO conspiracy theory but Carrie lacks this know-how (or has some contrary know-how) doesn't even remotely look like a disagreement, just a difference. For example, that A knows how to ride a bike, but doesn't know how to drive a car, and that B doesn't know how to ride a bike, but knows how to drive a car, is *not* a disagreement between A and B, but a difference in the ways they can act. So, analyzing animal certainties in terms of ability knowledge wouldn't do the non-factualist any good here.

4. The Non-belief Theory

In his recent (2015, *forthcoming*) work, Duncan Pritchard has developed a novel non-epistemic theory of hinge commitments according to which they are propositions, just not believable. Call this the *non-belief theory*. As with the non-factual theory, this too would provide a route to non-epistemicism. After all, if believing, or any doxastic state, like credal judgments, are not the sorts of attitudes you could take to hinge propositions, then how could you *justifiably* believe or take some credal attitude to a hinge proposition? Intuitively, you couldn't.

Why does Pritchard accept the non-belief theory of hinge commitments? His (2015) argument goes as follows:

Normative-profile of Belief: Beliefs (or any doxastic attitudes) are, in their nature, responsive to epistemic reasons.

Non-epistemicism: Our attitudes to hinge propositions are, in their nature, unresponsive to epistemic reasons.

Therefore,

Non-belief Theory: Our attitudes to hinge propositions are not beliefs (and are thereby non-doxastic).¹⁹

The normative profile of belief premise is highly plausible. Beliefs seem to be necessarily subject to epistemic rationality norms, and the premise doesn't say that beliefs are *only* propositional attitudes subject to certain kinds of epistemic norms. So, it doesn't give a normative-profile *theory* of belief, but rather says that it's a necessary condition on belief. Moreover, it doesn't say that beliefs are, by their nature, *rational*. Rather it says that it's in their nature *to be subject to* epistemic rationality norms. Together with the second premise, the non-belief theory clearly follows. Thus, the argument is valid. But the lacuna in the argument is the second premise, which expresses non-epistemicism about hinge propositions. And since the non-epistemicism argument is the main argument we have been exploring for pessimism about deep disagreement, we need to ask why Pritchard supports non-epistemicism.

Here is Pritchard's (2011) argument for non-epistemicism:

(P1) All rational doubts are grounded in reasons.

(P2) In order for reason R to count as a rational ground for S's doubt in the proposition *p*, it must be more certain for S that R than *p*.

(C1) So, those propositions which are most certain cannot be rationally doubted. (From P1, P2).

(P3) All rational beliefs are grounded in reasons.

(P4) In order for reason R to count as a rational ground for S's belief in the proposition *p*, it must be more certain for S that R than *p*.

(C2) So, those propositions which are most certain cannot be rationally believed. (From P3, P4)

(P5) But all belief-systems must include propositions which are held to be optimally certain. Therefore,

Therefore,

Non-epistemicism: One's belief-system requires the existence of propositions, the hinge propositions, which one's commitment to, while optimally certain, are immune to rational doubt or rational support. (From C1, C2, P5). See Pritchard (2011: 197).

Premises (P2) and (P4) are controversial. Consider cases of undercutting defeat. Sometimes, I get a reason to doubt that some source of my belief that P is well-founded or reliable, and thus reason to withhold believing that P. But that doesn't mean that *my reason* for doubting that the source of my belief that P is more certain for me than P is itself. For example, it might be that my senses are something I trust very often, and right now I believe that the wall is red on the basis of my visual experience. Now my friend Jan tells me that there are some red lights shining on the wall which makes the wall look red even though it's white. In this case, I might be less certain that a red light is shining on the wall which makes it look red than I am that the wall is red, but Jan's testimony still *undermines* my belief that the wall is red.

¹⁹ For this argument, see Pritchard (2015), pp. 90-91.

Intuitively, I should be *less* confident than I was prior to his testimony. So, (P2) needn't be true.

Likewise, (P4) is problematic for similar reasons. Intuitively, my reason for believing one thing—say, *that I have hands right now*—might be slightly more certain for me than I am in my reason for believing it: say, *that I see that I have hands*. For I might be far more confident in the fact that I have hands than that I *see* that I do right now.²⁰ Indeed, the chicken sexer case illustrates this idea nicely. The chicken sexers are normally certain, for any chick they see, that it's male (or female), but they are less certain of why they believe this, that is, of what their reason is for so believing. Still, we don't hesitate to say that they know that the chick is male (or female). So, I don't think this argument is convincing.

In any case, I think that the non-belief theory itself problematizes the idea of disagreement over hinge propositions. Consider first the intuitively plausible doxastic theory of disagreement, according to which disagreement consists in inconsistent doxastic attitudes (Marques 2014). Paradigmatically, this is the case when you believe that p and you are knowingly confronted by somebody else who believes that $\neg p$. The doxastic theory doesn't say that only inconsistency in *belief* is necessary for disagreement, but rather inconsistency in any *doxastic attitude*. For example, if my credence in p is .9, while your credence in $\neg p$ is .7, the theory rightly predicts that we disagree (if only slightly). If the doxastic theory of disagreement is true, it would follow straightforwardly from the non-belief theory that you cannot disagree over hinge propositions. Now, you might think that this isn't right, because Pritchard's theory is explicitly about belief: that we cannot *believe* hinge propositions or their negations. But notice that the first premise of the argument for the non-belief theory, the *normative-profile of belief premise*, applies just as much to *any* doxastic attitude as it does to belief. Take, for example, credence and suspension of judgment. Why think that belief is, by its very nature, subject to epistemic norms but that credal states and suspension of judgment are not? Surely whether you epistemically ought to be confident to some degree that p is subject to epistemic norms; and surely whether you epistemically ought to suspend judgment either way about whether p is also subject to epistemic norms.²¹ So, the normative profile of belief premise can easily be modified to accommodate doxastic attitudes more generally.

In his (*forthcoming*), however, Pritchard maintains that the doxastic theory of disagreement is false (see Pritchard *forthcoming*: 2). On his view:

Rather than belief being what is necessary for a *bona fide* disagreement, what's required is rather a genuine conviction on each side (i.e., a conviction that p that excludes agnosticism about the truth of p)

²⁰ Compare with Pritchard (2016): “just as one cannot make sense of a rational basis for doubt of a hinge commitment, for the very same reason one cannot make sense of a rational basis for belief of a hinge commitment either. They provide, rather, the framework relative to which a rational evaluation, whether positive or negative, takes place. Such commitments are thus essentially arational” (Pritchard 2016: 10).

²¹ The claim I am making here is conditional: if you think that belief is subject to epistemic norms, then by parity of reasoning, you ought to think that any doxastic attitude, like credence and suspension of judgment, are also subject to epistemic norms. So, this leaves it entirely open that someone could accept this claim whilst consistently denying that belief is essentially subject to epistemic norms, or to deny that there are any epistemic norms.

On Pritchard's view, then, there can be cases where you are convinced that p and your opponent is convinced that $\neg p$, such that neither of you believe the corresponding propositions (or have any credence), *and* you nevertheless disagree.

Although Pritchard argues that there are no rationally grounded propositional attitudes to hinge propositions, I think the case is much worse than this. For I think that his view entails that you are *irrational* once you reflect on your commitment to hinge propositions. On his picture, you can simultaneously realize that you are convinced that, say, the Earth existed in the distant past, whilst also recognizing that you cannot believe this. So, this looks like a straightforwardly Moore-paradoxical commitment:

(1) The Earth existed millions of years ago, but I don't believe it.

Indeed, a Moore-paradoxical commitment is straightforwardly implied by the non-belief theory and Pritchard's view that you lack an epistemically rational basis for the hinge propositions, namely that:

(2) The Earth existed millions of years ago, but I have no rational basis for this.

Likewise, the same problem arises for conviction:

(3) I'm convinced that the Earth existed millions of years ago, but I have no rational basis for this.

(3) looks like a confession of irrationality, rather than an expression of the agent's arationality. The non-belief theory says that (a) you cannot believe hinge propositions, because belief is, by its very nature, responsive to epistemic reasons, but that no cognitive attitude to a hinge proposition is responsive to epistemic reasons. Nevertheless, (b) you are committed to the truth of the hinge propositions, such that you can recognize this commitment and be convinced of the truth of the hinge propositions. Thus, it looks like the nonbelief theory implies that, for any hinge proposition HP, you are committed to 'HP but I don't have any rational basis for HP', which is intuitively *irrational*. That is, while we can say that your truth-committed conviction attitude to the hinge proposition is not irrational but merely arational, nevertheless your commitment *to that combination* is irrational. There is a tension between the first-order and the higher-order attitudes, such that it intuitively looks epistemically irrational.

What I'm proposing is that if you are convinced that that the Earth existed millions of years ago, while your conspiracy foe is convinced that it hasn't, then, given the non-belief theory, we ought to be able to recognize that we lack any rational basis one way or the other, and thus *shouldn't be convinced* as we are. To see this point more clearly, consider the following scenario:

NON-BELIEVERS: Jill has recently read Pritchard's new book and papers on the nature of hinge commitments, and has become an ardent believer in the non-belief theory of hinge propositions. Jane has also recently read Pritchard's recent book and papers on the nature of hinge commitments, and has also become an ardent believer in the nonbelief theory of hinge propositions. However, Jill and Jane were raised in very different communities. Jill was raised within a conspiracy theorist commune, while Jane was raised in a scientific community. Jill and Jane later meet at university and become friends. Now, Jill is thoroughly convinced that the Earth was created by a God, but Jane is thoroughly

convinced that it wasn't. Since they both recognize that they have no rational basis either way, they are happy to say to each other, respectively: 'The Earth was/was not created by God, but I have no rational basis for this'.

Intuitively, the non-believers case suggests that Jill and Jane ought to give up their convictions, given their higher-order attitudes, namely, their beliefs that they lack any rational grounds for being convinced as they are.

To recap, we've been looking at what supports (P2) of the Wittgensteinian Argument, that disagreement over hinge commitments are rationally irresolvable. We considered the *non-epistemicism argument* for this premise: that because hinge commitments aren't in the market for rational belief or doubt, they aren't in the market for rational disagreement and thus rationally resolving such disagreements are impossible. I've argued that if the non-epistemicism argument is sound, then we have a good case for pessimism about deep disagreement. However, I've also argued that one major defense of non-epistemicism, the *non-factual theory*, supports non-epistemicism at the cost of losing the possibility of deep disagreement, or else it fails to recover the mechanics of genuine disagreement in such cases. Additionally, the theory took on controversial commitments. I then turned to a second way of developing non-epistemicism, the *non-belief theory*, and argued that even if the theory permitted the possibility of deep disagreement, it looks like they would be rationally irresolvable. However, this theory seems to have problematic consequences as well. So, while the non-epistemicism argument appears to adequately support pessimism, non-epistemicism itself seems implausible. One might think that if non-epistemicism is rejected, (P2) of the Wittgensteinian Argument will be unsupported.

5. Inferential Contextualism

Let's now consider a defense of (P2) by way of an epistemic theory of hinge commitments, according to which our hinge commitments are amenable to epistemic attitudes. One such theory is *inferential contextualism*, the thesis that (i) there are hinge propositions and (ii) hinges propositions are what Williams (1991, 2007) calls "methodological necessities" of a "context of inquiry". For example, consider the case of geology—a context of inquiry—whereby the geologist is using radiocarbon dating to determine the age of some stones. A methodological necessity of this inquiry, and perhaps geology more generally, is that *stones exists*, that *stones have existed for millions of years*, and that *radiocarbon dating is a reliable method for determining the age of stones*. According to Williams:

Methodological necessities are standing presuppositions such that questioning them would lead one to question the competence of the form of inquiry they enable. In this way, they determine the *disciplinary meta-context* for such practices as historical research (Williams 2007, 102-3).

Now, it's important to note that Williams thinks that methodological necessities are not merely *presuppositions* of a context of inquiry. Rather, they are amenable to evidence as well. The point is rather that, within a context of inquiry, the methodological necessities *in fact* go undoubted (cf. Wittgenstein OC §341-3). Moreover, they are also amenable to revision. There is a limit to this revision, however. The limit is that too much revision generates a change in subject, and with it, a change in the context of inquiry. On this point, Williams says that:

[...] radical questioning can involve a change of subject. This is especially relevant to skeptical questioning. Raising general doubts about the usability of documentary and

other historical evidence would not be not an especially rigorous approach to historical research, any more than entertaining skeptical doubts about the reality of the external world would be an exceptionally careful way of conducting experiments in physics. Rather, to bring up such issues changes the subject from history, or physics, to (a certain kind of) epistemology (which, as we are discovering, has disciplinary presuppositions of its own) (Williams 2007, 103).

So, for example, in the case of geology, if we question the reliability of geological methods generally, we change the context of inquiry from one of geology to something else. This is especially clear in the case of disagreement between a young Earth creationist and a geologist, for instance. Imagine the two engaged in a dispute about whether a natural old Earth hypothesis best explains the origin of the Earth. The thought is that, if the young Earth creationist doubts geological methods, and the intellectual authority of geologists and the scientific institutions which foster their research, then they have changed the subject from geology to something else. The point is even starker if the young Earth creationist generally doubts the reliability of natural scientific methods. In short, the context of inquiry will be changed.

Now let's apply this idea to a case of deep disagreement. Consider the proposition that the Earth existed in the distant past (EDP) and its epistemic counterpart, that we have good reasons to believe this (EDP*). On Williams's view, whether EDP has the *status* of being a hinge proposition is determined by the context of inquiry. As such, EDP's status as a hinge proposition is susceptible to context-shiftiness depending on the context of inquiry. For example, in the geological context, EDP earns the status as a hinge proposition. However, in certain religious, conspiratorial and philosophical contexts, EDP might lose the status as a hinge proposition. For example, a presentist might deny EDP, while an ordinary thinker is liable to accept EDP. Moreover, a skeptic about the past is liable to deny EDP*, even though most ordinary people are liable to accept EDP*. In these cases of philosophical disagreement, EDP and EDP* have lost their hinge proposition status, a status they might have in geology and archaeology. In these cases, then, *disagreement* over EDP and EDP* *qua* hinge propositions is impossible. For it's merely a philosophical disagreement, rather than a disagreement over hinge propositions as such.

Generalizing from this case of philosophical disagreement, then, it looks as if disagreement over hinges as such is impossible. The general line of thought here is that, in a context in which EDP or EDP* have the status of being hinge propositions, doubting or disputing them would *change the context*: we would shift the status of EDP or EDP* from hinge to non-hinge. Therefore, insofar as EDP or EDP* have the epistemic status of being hinge propositions, we cannot disagree over EDP or EDP*, bringing reasons to bear for or against them. Doing so would change the subject (the context of inquiry) so that what we are disputing are no longer hinge propositions. Indeed, Williams himself seems to anticipate this consequence. He says that:

[...] introducing sceptical doubts about whether the Earth really existed a hundred years (or five minutes ago) does not lead to a more careful way doing history: it changes the subject, from history to epistemology (Williams 1991: 122).

Adding later that:

In particular contexts of inquiry, certain propositions stand fast as a matter of methodological necessity (ibid 124).

What I am suggesting here is that EDP and EDP* might have the status of being hinge propositions in geological and historical contexts, but if the geologists or historians were to reject EDP or EDP*, following what Williams said, they would change the context from geology or history to some other theoretical context. And in those contexts, the thought is that neither of those propositions have the epistemic status of being hinge propositions. That's precisely why philosophers can rationally engage in disagreement over them.

The consequence of the inferential contextualist view of hinge propositions, then, is that disagreement over them results in context-shifts, such that while disputants can genuinely engage in disagreement over propositions such as EDP or EDP*, doing so downgrades their epistemic status from hinge to non-hinge propositions. Thus, disagreement over them *whilst they retain their epistemic status of being hinge propositions* is impossible. So, it's hard to see how inferential contextualism avoids the consequence that genuine disagreement over hinges propositions as such are impossible. In this way, inferential contextualism support (P2) but only at the cost of losing deep disagreement so understood.

6. Entitlement Theory

Suppose we think that you can't justifiably believe a hinge proposition on the basis of any evidence. According to entitlement theorists such as Crispin Wright, it can nevertheless be *epistemically rational* for you to take some cognitive attitude to them anyway.

For Wright, hinge propositions are defined at least in part by their relation to what he calls "cognitive projects". A cognitive project is essentially a question-procedure pair: a question and a procedure for answering that question. A hinge proposition is what Wright calls a general "authenticity condition" of the procedure being a legitimate way of finding out the answer to the question. For example, consider the question "what is the weather like right now?". One procedure for successfully answering this question is using your perception. This question-procedure pair defines your cognitive project. An authenticity condition of the success of your cognitive project is that *perception is reliable*. And every cognitive project has an authenticity condition for your select procedure to be a way of finding out the answer to your question such that it leads to you to know the answer or justifiably believe it.

It's important to note that not every authenticity condition of a cognitive project is a hinge proposition. For the hinge propositions are authenticity conditions that are "common to a large sweep of cognitive projects of a given kind" (Wright 2014: 216).²² For example, if you're interested in the question of whether there are other minds, you might start by asking whether your best friend has a mind as proxy for the more general question. And suppose you get what you take to be very strong evidence that they do, on the basis of their behavior and by analogy with your own. Wright's idea is that your procedure for answering this question presupposes, as an authenticity-condition on the success of your procedure (understood here as knowledge or justification producing), *that there are other minds*. And since such an authenticity condition is plausibly common to many cognitive projects, it's a hinge proposition.

²² Here's Wright explicitly: "Wittgenstein's metaphor of questions and enquiry as pivoting on 'hinges' raises the question, how to characterize the range of the propositions he seems to have had in mind—the 'hinge propositions'—and their role: how exactly does enquiry 'turn' on them? The examples in *On Certainty* are a mixed bag, but we can approach the kind of thing Wittgenstein seems to be gesturing at by focusing, first, on the notion of an authenticity-condition" (Wright 2014: 214).

Now, suppose you doubted that there are other minds. Wright thinks that doubting this proposition, a hinge proposition, should systematically lead you to doubt many other non-hinge propositions:

Such a doubt will be a doubt which ought—rationally—to ramify into a more general doubt of some sort: a doubt about any investigation that uses some relevant apparatus or relies upon on a certain kind of evidence, or a doubt about the good standing of all previous investigations of a certain kind, or about the very subject matter of a large class of investigations, or about the propriety of their methods (Wright 2014: 216).

Wright's epistemology of hinge propositions flows from what he thinks their role is in the justificational architecture of belief. For example, consider that there is an external, physical world. Suppose you believe that the nearby park which you can clearly see has some trees in it. Wright's view is that your evidence here is broadly perceptual and abductive. None of your evidence, however, *guarantees* that there are trees there, or that there is even a park there. In this case, you have some aggregate evidence E (your perceptual experience and your abductive, explanatory considerations) a belief that P (there are trees in the park here), a type of epistemic justification, and an authenticity-condition A (there is an external physical world). Now we need to introduce two characters who build a theory of the structure of justification around cases like this. The *conservative* holds that E justifies you in believing that P only if you already have justification to believe²³ that A, while the *liberal* holds that E can justify you in believing that P as long as you lack reasons to doubt that A. You don't, in addition, need to be justified in believing that A before E can justify you in believing that P. (cf. Wright 2014: 217-218).

One might think that conservatism about the structure of justification entails skepticism. For example, in our external world case, conservatism implies that you justifiably believe that P on the basis of E only if you antecedently justifiably believe that A (*there is an external, physical world*). We could easily conjoin that with A*: that you aren't a brain-in-a-vat in which it seems to you that there is an external world. But how *could* you justifiably believe that A* is false *independently* of your justification E to believe that P and similar propositions? Here's Wright on this:

The difficulty with the 'heavyweights', or cornerstones—the big, general hinges of the ilk [...] is that the very possibility of independent investigation is itself shrouded in sceptical doubt [...] What cognitive project can I undertake in order to engage the question whether there is an external material world save one which assigns to my apparent perceptual experience the very evidential significance for which the existence of an external material world is an authenticity-condition? But, then, if, as conservatism may seem to require, I need to investigate that condition independently, I am stuck. (Wright 2014: 221).

However, Wright doesn't think that this entails that you lack epistemic justification which favors accepting that there is an external world: we can be "entitled to accept" that there is an external world, even if we lack evidence for it (Wright 2004: 53). So, Wright's thought is that conservatism doesn't entail skepticism because there is a type of epistemic justification, *epistemic entitlement*, which we have by default—as an *epistemic right*—independently of

²³ As we'll see, Wright's type of conservatism about the structure of justification holds that you can't justifiably *believe* A (e.g., general authenticity-conditions—the hinge propositions), but you can justifiably *trust* A. It is of course open to one to be a conservative about the structure of justification without accepting Wright's specific form of it.

evidence and any sort of cognitive achievement. Entitlement for p is thus a *non-evidential* reason to ‘accept’ that p . Wright says that:

To be entitled to accept a proposition has no connection whatever with the likelihood of its truth. We are entitled to proceed on the basis of certain beliefs merely because there is no extant reason to disbelieve them and because, unless we make some such commitments, we cannot proceed at all (Wright 2004: 53. cf. Hazlett 2014: 6).

So, an entitlement for p doesn’t count at all towards the truth of p . Now one might think that this makes it strange to combine entitlement with belief. Why should you *believe* that p if you are only entitled to p , since having such an entitlement bears no connection whatever to the truth of p ? Believing is an attitude to truths, and it’s difficult to see why one should believe that p is true once one recognizes that they are only entitled to p —something which doesn’t count at all towards the truth of p .

Wright recognizes this issue, and thus doesn’t think that the attitude that entitlement is linked to is *belief*, but rather ‘trust’ or ‘trusting acceptance’:

Of course it is often, perhaps normally, irrational to confidently assume or take the truth of propositions on trust. But the basic insight behind the entitlement project—Wittgenstein’s insight, I believe—is that all reflective enquiry, and all reflective cognitive accomplishment, is essentially situated in trusting acceptances, some general, others specific to the particular context of enquiry, for which we lack evidence. This is not a shortcoming, a lapse which, though unavoidable, is nevertheless regrettable. It is in the nature of rational reflective inquiry that this should be so. [...] The accumulation of evidential reason to believe is possible only within the framework set by trusting acceptances” (Wright 2014: 242).²⁴

Wright’s point here is that even though we *can* believe hinge propositions, epistemically *we shouldn’t*.²⁵ So, if our attitudes to hinge propositions should be trust or trusting acceptance, we should ask whether trust is robust enough to be a *disagreeing-attitude*. To see how this might work, let’s return to our CONSPIRACY THEORY DISAGREEMENT case. Suppose now that Alex trusts that conspiracy theory is true while Carrie trusts that it is false. Now, in virtue of their attitudes to inconsistent contents, are they disagreeing? It’s not so clear that they are. On the one hand, the pair:

DISAGREEMENT IN PROPOSITIONAL TRUST

Alex trust that p (the conspiracy theory is true).

Carrie trust that $\neg p$ (the conspiracy theory is false).

looks like a disagreement. It seems rationally non-cotenable—intuitively, you can’t *rationally* trust that p and trust that $\neg p$ at the same time—and at least one person seems to be at fault: for if one of them is right, this precludes the other from being right. But it’s not clear that this

²⁴ cf. “The attitude to the local hinges and cornerstones has to be one of *non-provisional confidence* if belief in the products is to be rationalized in turn. At the same time, it needs to be a rational attitude to take for reasons other than our possession of evidential support for the effectiveness of the methods concerned. This was the train of thought that led me to propose that any useful form of entitlement had to license *rational trust*” (Wright 2014: 226).

²⁵ Many philosophers have criticized Wright’s entitlement theory on the grounds that entitlement at best gives one *prudential* reason to trust that p , rather than a genuinely *epistemic* reason to trust that p . See Jenkins (2007), Pederson (2009), and Pritchard (2015). For another defense of the entitlement theory, see Hazlett (2006).

is a genuine disagreement until we understand what propositional trust is here. Compare with:

DISAGREEMENT IN PROPOSITIONAL HOPE

Alex hopes that p .

Carrie hopes that $\neg p$.

In the same way as with propositional trust, at least one of them is at fault here: for this is guaranteed by the fact that their attitudes are directed at inconsistent propositions. Moreover, we might think that hoping that p and hoping that $\neg p$ is rationally non-cotenable: there is something odd about hoping both that, say, Real Madrid will win the match and that they'll lose the match. Yet, despite these facts, it's not clear that our second case *is* a disagreement. Imagine, for example, that you hope that Real Madrid will lose the match, while your friend hopes that they won't. It might be that you *believe* that they will win, however, since their track-record is impeccable, while your friend believes the same. In lieu of this, it would certainly be odd to say that your differences in what you hope for constitutes a disagreement. Rather, it seems like you agree (given that you believe the same proposition), but you simply hope for different outcomes.²⁶

We can extend this idea to the CONSPIRACY THEORY DISAGREEMENT case as follows. It might be that Carrie trusts that the theory is false, while Alex trusts that it's true, and yet they are both inclined to believe that it's true. Perhaps Carrie was raised in a family which is active in conspiracy politics, and has the right sort of psychological dispositions which make global conspiracies seem attractive. Carrie of course trusts that there is no such conspiracy: perhaps she reasoned that trusting that there is no such conspiracy will make her more likely to get true beliefs about the world and be a better inquirer more generally. Or perhaps she thinks that everyone has the epistemic right to take such a commitment for granted. But she is, like Alex, nevertheless inclined to believe it.

This sort of case should be intelligible on Wright's picture of entitlement as rational trust. Wright himself maintains that entitlement to trust that p doesn't entail entitlement to *believe* that p . *Ipso facto*, you shouldn't believe that p if you're *only* entitled to trust that p , for then you would be believing without any evidence or anything which indicates that p is true. So, cases where you *trust that p whilst disbelieving p* should be possible. Otherwise, Wright would need to say that such a case is impossible or else irrational, which would speak against the entitlement theory.

If we suppose that the entitlement theory doesn't excluded genuine disagreement over hinge propositions, are such disagreements rationally resolvable? Note that entitlement to trust is non-optional. If you're entitled to trust that a hinge proposition H is true, it doesn't seem like it's optional for you to choose *not* to be entitled to trust H is true: entitlement is stable and involuntarily, and not the result of any cognitive achievement. Now imagine that while you trust that H and you meet someone who you know distrusts that H . Suppose this is a disagreement. Wright's entitlement theory seems to entail that you are entitled to trust that H , while the other person is not entitled to distrust that H . However, they *are* entitled to trust what you trust, namely, that H . For entitlements are *unearned*: you don't have to *do* anything in order to get the epistemic right to trust the hinge propositions. You get them for free (cf.

²⁶ Ridge (2014) makes a similar point about 'disagreement in attitude'. See pp. 173-174.

Wright 2004). Hence, it seems to follow that, *if* trusting that *H* and distrusting that *H* is a disagreement, then a rational resolution for the disagreement over *H* is *de facto* possible because it's already settled: rationally *both* of you are entitled to trust *H*. Hence, what you both epistemically ought to do is trust the proposition for which you are both entitled, namely, *H*.

Let's return to the question of whether the Wittgensteinian theory of deep disagreement provides adequate support for pessimism. It seems as if Wright's entitlement theory makes room for the possibility of rationally resolving disagreement over hinge propositions and thus, on the Wittgensteinian theory at least, deep disagreement. For while neither of us epistemically ought to believe the target propositions, if you distrust that the Earth has been around for millions of years, as a result of your belief in the conspiracy that it's a virtual artifact of malicious beings, while I trust that it has been, Wright's view seems to imply that we *both* epistemically ought to only trust that the Earth has been around for millions of years. For we are both already epistemically entitled to such trust anyway. Notice, however, that this way of rationally resolving a disagreement won't fit the paradigm case of rationally resolving disagreements, since rational resolution here amounts to drawing your interlocutor's attention to their default entitlement to trust the hinge commitments you are both default entitled to accept. The legwork will be in figuring out *how* to change their attitude so as to stop believing what they believe and to recognize their entitlement to trust what you trust.

7. Objections and Replies

7.1. *Non-factualism*

Objection: Suppose that there can be disagreements in non-cognitive attitudes (Stevenson 1963). If this supposition is true, it's hard to see why one couldn't account for disagreement along non-factualist lines: they could just say that there are contrary pro-/con-attitudes that each participant maintains, constituting a disagreement, albeit one in *non-cognitive attitude* rather than doxastic attitude.

Reply: my argument is not for the view that there are no disagreements in non-cognitive attitude. My view is rather that if non-factualism is the right account of hinge commitments, then it has highly revisionary consequences for our thinking about disagreement over the existence of the external physical world, the reliability of induction, and so on; consequences which I don't think are very plausible. My argument goes like this: in many cases of such disagreement, the apparently disagreeing parties provide what they take to be reasons for believing what they apparently take themselves to believe. However, if non-factualism were true, then in the relevant cases, either the apparently disagreeing parties are merely faultlessly disagreeing; or they aren't really providing reasons for their beliefs; or they don't really believe what they apparently take themselves to believe. This is a revisionary consequence: one that we shouldn't assign very much weight until we've considered the rest of the options.

Objection to the Reply: You haven't shown that they can't have *reasons* for their non-cognitive attitudes; or that they really do *believe* their commitments. So, one can consistently maintain that it would be highly revisionary if non-factualism had those consequences, but so far you haven't shown that it has those consequences.

Reply to the Objection: Let me summarize why it has those consequences. Non-factualism maintains that (a) your hinge commitments are non-factual norms, *and* (b) that

you don't have any epistemic reasons for having/lacking such commitments. Given (a), it follows that no one can take any truth-apt attitude to the proposition that "there is an external physical world" expresses (since it's a hinge commitment). This applies, *mutatis mutandis*, to the other plausible candidates for hinge commitments, like "there are other minds", "perception is reliable", "the world has existed in the distant past", "nature is uniform", etc. Moreover, given (b), no one can have any epistemic reasons for believing, or acting in accordance with hinge commitments, either. That is a highly revisionary consequence, if anything is. I don't need to show that anybody believes the propositions that the (aforementioned) sentences express. It's simply a reasonable presupposition. And in any case, it fits with the best explanation of why people *seem* to give reasons for believing them. Consider Moore and Reid, among others, who argued for the existence of an external physical world. They gave reasons for believing it. Kant and Berkeley, however, gave reasons against believing it. The best explanation of this practice is that they were doing what they said (and plausibly thought) they were doing.

7.2. *Non-belief Theory*

Objection: You argued that the non-belief theory predicts commitment to seemingly Moore-paradoxical propositions, such as that (i) "the Earth exists in the distant past, but I don't believe it" and (ii) "I'm convinced that the Earth exists in the distant past, but I don't believe it". However, (ii) sounds odd because semantically it expresses the idea that you believe that you are convinced that P, but don't believe that you are convinced that P. That's irrational, but the non-belief theory doesn't commit one to that: you can reasonably believe that you are convinced that P, and yet not believe that P. And (i) sounds odd because it semantically expresses that you believe that P but that you don't believe that P, which is irrational. Luckily, the non-belief theory denies the first conjunct (that you believe that P, when P is a hinge proposition). So, the ascription of *irrationality* here is misguided.

Reply: I gave two related arguments. The first was that assertions like "there is an external world, but I don't believe it" sound paradoxical (Moore-paradoxical), and it's hard to see what resources the non-belief theory has to explain this. They *can* say that it sounds paradoxical on the grounds that the sentence semantically expresses the conjunction that you believe there is an external world, but don't believe that there is—which is a contradiction—but then they shoot themselves in the foot: for then the assertion of "there is an external world" would need to be understood semantically as that you believe that there is an external world, which would come out false on their account (since you can't believe it, on their account). They *could* go the route that when you assert such a sentence, you *pragmatically imply* that you believe the first conjunct, but then that gives us an irrational verdict as well: were you ever to assert "there is an external world" (as Moore did), you would be implying to the listener that you believe what you said, when, given the non-belief theory, you don't.

My second argument was that the person who came to see that they were only merely convinced that P whilst not having any reason whatsoever to believe that P epistemically *shouldn't* retain their conviction; that doing so would be epistemically *irrational*. I can't see why, provided there are epistemic norms regulating our doxastic attitudes, it doesn't regulate conviction that P in such a way that the higher-order evidence that *you lack epistemic reasons for P* shouldn't obligate you to *give up your conviction*. Maybe you'll say that Pritchard's (2015) account shows that you *can* be convinced while recognizing that conviction isn't subject to epistemic rationality norms, but the onus is on Pritchard to explain why that is.

Intuitively, if I'm convinced that P and you give me a defeater for P, I shouldn't be convinced any longer.²⁷

7.3. *Inferential Contextualism*

Objection: you claimed that there aren't any disagreements over hinge propositions on the contextualist theory, because anything which led to disagreement over them would necessarily change the context to one in which the target propositions lost their status as hinge propositions. But this is really strange: certainly, it's not always that case that if somebody began to disagree with me over the reliability of some scientific method (say, carbon dating), we would be shifting the context: it might still be a scientific context in which we are reasonably inquiring into the reliability of that method.

Reply: My claim is not that every disagreement over some method M shifts the context of inquiry C. My claim is rather that if M has the status of *a hinge proposition* of C, then any disagreement over M's truth therein removes that status, and *that's* what shifts the context of inquiry. After all, it's partly constitutive of it being a hinge proposition of C, that M is presupposed by the inquirers in C. It follows that as soon as M is no longer presupposed by those inquirers, M is no longer a hinge proposition of C. Thus, even though the disagreement over M might continue, it's not strictly a disagreement over a hinge proposition any longer.

Objection to the Reply: You seem to equate the property of <being a hinge proposition of C> with the property of <being taken to be a hinge proposition of C> (under some mode of presentation, e.g., as a proposition they take for granted in their inquiry). Your argument only seems to show that as soon as the inquirers begin to disagree over M, M is no longer *taken* by them to be a hinge proposition of C, not that M *is* no longer a hinge proposition of C.

Reply to the Objection: The property of being a hinge proposition, on this account at least, simply *is* the property of being a methodological presupposition by the inquirers of C in order to reach their epistemic goals (e.g., the property that carbon dating has in geology, given the goal of using carbon to dating to come to know the age of some rocks: that it is a way of finding out the age of rocks). So, at least on this account of hinge propositions, the two properties are the same. One might want to propose and defend a novel contextualist theory of hinge propositions on which they are different, but that would be different from the theory I evaluated here, and outside the scope of what I can reasonably assess here.

7.4. *Entitlement Theory*

Objection: you said that on the entitlement theory, entitlement is not optional: you can't work your way out of your entitlement, as it were. The idea, then, is that if you're entitled to trust that P, and you do trust that P, while your interlocutor trusts that $\neg P$, then they are aren't entitled to trust that P. But why does that follow? Why couldn't they be entitled to trust $\neg P$ even though you're entitled to trust that P?²⁸

Reply: Wright's view of entitlement is that the entitlement relation holds between you and a proposition you trust, *objectively*. Put another way, whether the relation of *...being entitled to trust...* holds between you and a proposition P depends on whether certain criteria, independently of what you believe, obtains. The criteria is that, by trusting P over some competitor, you'd be *epistemically better off* than by trusting the competitor. For

²⁷ Acknowledgement.

²⁸ Acknowledgement.

example, consider the *unknown fruit case*, in which you are marooned on an island with only some fruit to eat which, for all you know, may or may not be poisonous (Wright 2014). The idea is that if you choose to eat the fruit, you might die (=objectively bad) if it's poisonous. However, you die if you don't eat the fruit (=objectively bad), since there's nothing else to eat, whereas you might live if you eat the unknown fruit (=objectively good), provided it's not poisonous. In the unknown fruit case, then, the idea is that you are entitled to trust that the fruit is not poisonous, *because* you are objectively better off doing that than the alternative of trusting that it's poisonous and not eating it. Given this reasoning, if someone else marooned themselves on the island, *they too* would be just as entitled to trust that the fruit is not poisonous, irrespective of what they believed.

Objection to the Reply: That's not clear at all, though. What if they had evidence that the fruits are poisonous? Certainly then they wouldn't be entitled to trust that the fruit is not poisonous. Secondly, why can't they be entitled to trust different, contrary hinge commitments? Consider the following scenario: person A raised in the Berkeleyan community is entitled to trust Berkeleyanism (theism, idealism, immaterialism), whereas person B raised in the Moorean community is entitled to trust Mooreanism (atheism, realism, materialism). If this scenario is possible, they are entitled to trust different sets of propositions, each of which act as hinge commitments of their worldviews, Berkeleyanism and Mooreanism, respectively. This looks like a disagreement in propositional trust where they are both entitled to retain their trust in contrary views. So, their disagreement isn't rationally resolvable after all.

Reply to the Objection: To the first point, entitlement to trust that P can be defeated by considerations which indicate that $\neg P$ (e.g., rebutting defeaters, see Hazlett 2006). In any case, were someone marooned on the island who had evidence that the fruits are poisonous, they wouldn't need be merely entitlement to trust that the fruits are poisonous. Rather, they would have evidence to believe that the fruits are poisonous. And certainly in the case where I go through the reasoning and recognize my entitlement to trust that the fruits are not poisonous, but you, the newly marooned islander, tell me not to eat them—that you have evidence that they are poisonous—it certainly seems like it would be irrational of me to continue to trust that they aren't poisonous. Rather, I should come to believe as you do.

To the second point, the proponent of the entitlement strategy has two options. The first option would be to endorse epistemic relativism, the thesis that “cognitive norms that determine what counts as knowledge, or whether a belief is rational, justifiable, etc. could vary with and are dependent on local conceptual or cultural frameworks and lack the universality they aspire or pretend to” (Baghrarian and Carter 2015). In turn, the charge from person A to B that “you're unjustified in your Mooreanism” would be true, and the charge from person B to A that “you're unjustified in your Berkeleyanism” would be true as well. So, they don't really disagree in that case: they're both right, after all. And so the question of rationally resolving the disagreement isn't apt here. The other option is to insist that only one of them is right: that entitlement to trust only holds between a person and a certain set of propositions. The dispute then would be over *which* propositions those are. (Wittgenstein (1969) and Wright (2014, 2004) seem to think that none of Berkeleyanism would be a part of that). And the proponent of the entitlement strategy would need to motivate which propositions they are, based on what makes one better off epistemically, given any cognitive project. Good candidates here include what Pritchard (2015) calls the “über hinge commitment” that you aren't radically and systematically deceived.

8. Conclusion

In this paper, I applied hinge epistemology to the case of deep disagreement. In particular, I considered the question of whether deep disagreements are rationally resolvable in light of the Wittgensteinian account of deep disagreement. I argued that on many ways of developing the theory of hinge commitments, the Wittgensteinian account would adequately support a pessimistic answer to this question (§§2-5). Specifically, non-epistemic theories of hinge commitments, such as the non-factual and the non-belief theories, seemed to adequately support pessimism. However, I argued that strictly speaking the Wittgensteinian account *can* be consistently combined with optimism about deep disagreement (§6). This is because insofar as hinge commitments are shared, rationally resolving disagreement over them is a matter of the disputants mutually recognizing their entitlement to trust their shared hinge commitments. Finally, while the Wittgensteinian theory alone doesn't adequately support deep disagreement pessimism, that many ways of developing it *do* seem to support it ought to make us look more critically at the theory. First, because one might think that pessimism about deep disagreement is an intolerable consequence—that surely such disagreements *can* be rationally resolved. And, secondly, since non-epistemicism has many implausible consequences in the case of disagreement, this puts considerable pressure on hinge epistemologists to reject the non-epistemic theory. As we've seen, hinge epistemology is mainly pessimistic about deep disagreement, but strictly speaking hinge epistemologists have optimistic options.

Bibliography

- Baghramian, Maria and Carter, J. Adam (2017). "Relativism", *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy* (Summer 2017 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.).
- Barkun, Michael (2003). *A Culture of Conspiracy*. University of California Press.
- Chrisman, Matthew (2012). Epistemic Expressivism. *Philosophy Compass* 7 (2):118-126.
- Christensen, David (2007). Epistemology of Disagreement: The Good News. *Philosophical Review* 116 (2):187-217.
- Coliva, A. (2015). *Extended Rationality: A Hinge Epistemology*. Palgrave Macmillan.
- Fogelin, R. (1985 [2005]). "The Logic of Deep Disagreements". *Informal Logic* 7 (1):3-11.
- Godden, David & Brenner, William H. (2010). "Wittgenstein and the Logic of Deep Disagreement". *Cogency: Journal of Reasoning and Argumentation* 2:41-80.
- Friedman, J. (2013) "Suspended Judgment". *Philosophical Studies*, vol. 162, issue 2, pp.165-181.
- Hazlett, A. (2013). "Entitlement and Mutually Recognized Reasonable Disagreement". *Episteme* (1): 1- 25.
- (2006). "How to Defeat Belief in the External World". *Pacific Philosophical Quarterly* 87 (2):198-212.
- Jenkins, C. (2007). "Entitlement and Rationality." *Synthese*, 157 (1): 25-45.
- Kappel, K. & Jønch-Clausen, Karin (2015). "Social Epistemic Liberalism and the Problem of Deep Epistemic Disagreements". *Ethical Theory and Moral Practice* 18 (2):371-384.
- Kappel, K. (2012). "The Problem of Deep Disagreement". *Discipline Filosofiche* 22 (2):7-25.
- Kornblith, Hilary (2015). The Role of Reasons in Epistemology. *Episteme* 12 (2):225-239.
- Lynch, M. (2016). "After the Spade Turns: Disagreement, First Principles and Epistemic Contractarianism". *International Journal for the Study of Skepticism*, issue 6, pp. 248-259.

- (2010). “Epistemic Circularity and Epistemic Disagreement”. *Social Epistemology*. In A. Haddock, A. Millar, D. Pritchard (eds.). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Moyal-Sharrock, D. (2016). “The Animal in Epistemology”. *International Journal for the Study of Skepticism*, issue 6, 97-119.
- (2004). *Understanding Wittgenstein’s On Certainty*. London: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Pedersen, N.J. (2009) “Entitlement, Value, and Rationality”. *Synthese*, 171: 443.
- Pritchard, D. (forthcoming). “Disagreement, of Belief and Otherwise”. *Voicing Dissent*, (ed.) C. Johnson, Routledge.
- (2016). “Epistemic Angst” *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research*. Online first: DOI 10.1111/phpr.12280
- (2015). *Epistemic Angst: Radical Skepticism and the Groundlessness of Our Believing*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press
- (2011a). “Wittgenstein on Scepticism”. In Kuusela and McGinn (eds.), *The Oxford Handbook of Wittgenstein*, Oxford University Press.
- (2011b). “Relativism, Epistemic Incommensurability, and Wittgensteinian Epistemology”. In S. D. Hales (ed.), *The Blackwell Companion to Relativism*. (pp. 266-285). Wiley-Blackwell. DOI 10.1002/9781444392494.ch14
- (2011c). “Wittgensteinian Pyrrhonism”. in D.E. Machuca (ed.), *Pyrrhonism in Ancient, Modern, and Contemporary Philosophy*, 193–202. Dordrecht: Springer.
- (2010). Epistemic Relativism, Epistemic Incommensurability and Wittgensteinian Epistemology, in S. Hales (ed.), *The Blackwell Companion to Relativism*. Oxford: Blackwell, 266–85.
- (2009). “Defusing Epistemic Relativism”, *Synthese* 166, 397-412.
- Pryor, J. (2014). “There is Immediate Justification”. In Matthias Steup & Ernest Sosa (eds.), *Contemporary Debates in Epistemology*, 2nd edition. Blackwell.
- Raz, J. (2011). *From Normativity to Responsibility*. Oxford University Press.
- Ridge, M. (2014). *Impassioned Belief*. Oxford University Press.
- (2012). “Disagreement”, *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research*, vol. LXXXVI, No. 1, 41-63.
- Stevenson, C. (1944). *Ethics and Language*. New Haven: Yale University Press.
- (1963). *Facts and Values*. New Haven: Yale University Press.
- Stroud, B. (2000). *Understanding Human Knowledge: Philosophical Essays*. Oxford University Press.
- Sylvan, K. (2016). Epistemic Reasons I: Normativity. *Philosophy Compass* 11 (7):364-376.
- Williams, M. (2007). “Why (Wittgensteinian) Contextualism Is Not Relativism”. *Episteme* 4 (1): 93-114.
- (1991). *Unnatural Doubts: Epistemological Realism and the Basis of Scepticism*. Oxford: Blackwell.
- Wittgenstein, L. (1969) *On Certainty*, ed. G. E. M. Anscombe and G. H. von Wright, tr. D. Pauland G. E. M. Anscombe. Oxford: Blackwell.
- Wright, C. (2014). “On Epistemic Entitlement II: Welfare State Epistemology”, *Scepticism and Perceptual Justification*. Dodd and Zardini (eds.). Oxford University Press.
- (2004). “Wittgensteinian Certainties”, in D. McManus ed., *Wittgenstein and Scepticism*. London: Routledge.
- (1985). “Facts and Certainty”, *Proceedings of the British Academy*, 71: 429–72.